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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of the ownership form of banks on the finance-growth nexus in Japan. If the 
cooperative ownership of banks has comparative advantages in local financial development, the failure of a 
cooperative bank should be more harmful than that of a commercial bank. The evidence in this paper, however, 
provokes skepticism to this view, suggesting less efficient operation of some cooperative banks in local communities 
probably due to weak mechanisms for management discipline.
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     1 Introduction
In local ﬁnancial markets, cooperative banks and their joint-stock counterparts compete
against each other. In the same way as other enterprises, joint-stock banks are organi-
zations that aim to maximize their proﬁts. In contrast, the stated aim of cooperative
banks is the maximization of consumer surplus to the extent of keeping them solvent
(Hesse and ˇ Cih´ ak, 2007). Regarding this fundamental property, existing studies, includ-
ing Fonteyne (2007) and Cuevas and Fischer (2006), point out the possible advantages
of cooperative banks over their joint-stock counterparts in breaking the market failure
that leads to credit rationing. According to Cuevas and Fischer (2006), it is a “natural
solution” to credit rationing to form the cooperatives among the agents that is rationed
out from access to ﬁnance.
Another possible advantage of cooperative banks is their potential ability to facilitate
ﬁnancial development in a rural area. In a competitive market, joint-stock banks may
have an extremely small incentive to develop a physical or institutional infrastructure
that facilitates the smooth operation of ﬁnancial intermediation in a rural area (e.g., a
branch network), because of the public good nature of information about the quality
of potential customers (Hellmann et al., 1997, 2000). That is, if the bank invests, but
the quality of the local market is poor, it loses its investment. Even if the quality is
high, competitive entry despoils its proﬁt immediately. In contrast, cooperative banks,
which pursue objectives other than proﬁt maximization, could develop such infrastruc-
ture for local ﬁnancial development at the expense of their own proﬁtability. In addition,
it should also be noted that in several countries, including Japan, the area of operation
for cooperative banks is geographically restricted directly/indirectly by the government.
In these cases, cooperative banks have no other choices except for cultivating their own
geographically restricted area of operation. For these reasons, it may seem plausible that
cooperative banks have potential advantages over their joint-stock counterparts in pro-
moting local economic growth by delivering more sophisticated ﬁnancial services in rural
areas. In fact, the literature provides strong evidence that local ﬁnancial development
could promote local economic growth (see, for instance, Guiso et al., 2004).
Nonetheless, the literature also casts doubt over the possible advantages of cooperative
banks over joint-stock ones, mainly because of weak governance mechanisms embedded
in them (e.g., Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Hesse and ˇ Cih´ ak, 2007). The standard agency
theory supposes that several equipments and mechanisms for corporate governance, such
as the board of directors, executive compensation, market for corporate control, concen-
trated holdings, or monitoring by ﬁnancial institutions, work to solve agency conﬂicts
between stockholders (principals) and managers (agents) (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000).
Like other non-proﬁt organizations, however, formal governance mechanisms for cooper-
ative banks appear very weak. Since the members/depositors of cooperative banks have
only a ﬁxed-value claim and are protected by a safety net (e.g., deposit insurance), they
may be less motivated to exert eﬀective oversight over bank management. Moreover,
in a one-person/one-vote arrangement for cooperative banks, the incentive to vote in
the general meeting would be lower for the average members than for a shareholders of
joint-stock banks (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of the ownership forms of banks on local
economic development. Our hypothesis is straightforward. If cooperative banks have
an advantage over joint-stock ones in breaking the market failures that leads to credit
rationing or in promoting rural ﬁnancial development, the marginal eﬀects of the failure
1of a cooperative bank should be more harmful than that of its joint-stock counterpart in
the economy.
To test this hypothesis, we focus on a single advanced country, which has been uniﬁed
from a legal, a regulatory, and an institutional point of view, Japan. The reason why
we study the case of Japan is its experience of the so-called lost decade in the 1990s,
which is characterized by diﬃcult and chaotic economic conditions. In those days, bank
failures were pervasive throughout the country. As Table 1 shows, 173 banks in total
failed during FY 1992–FY 2001 and the ﬁnancial assistance provided to failed banks by
the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) amounted to 21.9 trillion yen.1 The
level of ﬁnancial integration within Japan, as well as other advanced economies, would
probably be higher than the level of integration across countries.2 Hence, if we ﬁnd the
evidence that the ownership form of failed banks matters for local growth within Japan,
we believe that we can conjecture that it would be also true across countries. Japan’s
experiences, therefore, provide a rare opportunity to investigate the hypothesis stated
above.
Similar to other related studies, however, the issue of causality arises and so does the
need for conducting irrefutable tests of the hypothesis. Since bank failures were coincident
with economic downturns during the lost decade in Japan, how can we identify the
direction of causality? To deal with the causality issue, we adopt the method developed
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) (henceforth RZ). RZ argue that better-developed ﬁnancial
sectors help overcome the market frictions that drive a wedge between the prices of
external and internal ﬁnance. If their assertion is true, more-bank-dependent industries
should suﬀer disproportionately more from local banking crises than less-bank-dependent
industries, and the failure of cooperative banks should aﬀect local economic growth more
severely than that of commercial banks. This provides solid evidence on the comparative
advantages of the cooperative ownership of banks in promoting local development in the
debate over the direction of causality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
Japanese banking system. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology
used in this paper. The empirical results and their interpretations are reported in Section
4. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Japanese Banking System: A Brief Overview
The Japanese ﬁnancial institutions that take deposits and make loans are classiﬁed into
two general groups based on their ownership forms, that is, joint-stock banks and coop-
erative ones. The former includes city banks (toshi gink¯ o), trust banks, long-term credit
banks,3 regional banks (chih¯ o gink¯ o), and second-tier regional banks (daini chih¯ o gink¯ o).
On the other hand, the latter includes Shinkin banks (shin'y¯ o kinko), credit coopera-
tives (shin'y¯ o kumiai), and other ﬁnancial institutions for labor, agriculture, ﬁshery, and
forestry.
Major banks, including city banks, trust banks, and the former long-term credit banks,
are with headquarters and their branch networks in Tokyo, Osaka, and other major
cities, and primarily lend to large customers. Regional banks conduct a majority of their
1The amounts of grant and asset purchases are about 16.3 trillion yen and 5.6 trillion yen, respectively.
2Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2004) provide a brief survey of the existing literature on ﬁnancial integra-
tion both within developed countries and across OECD member countries.
3By 2006, however, all long-term credit banks have changed into ordinal commercial banks.
2operations within the prefecture in which they are based and have strong ties with local
enterprises.
Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives, which are dominant entities in the cooperative
banking sector in Japan, provide ﬁnancial services to small and medium enterprises and
local residents within a geographically restricted area. In principle, these banks adopt a
one-member/one-vote principle. However, most of the banks actually appoint the rep-
resentatives of their members (soudai), and a meeting of them (soudai-kai) works as
the supreme decision-making body in the institutions. Since other cooperative ﬁnancial
institutions for labor, agriculture, ﬁshery, and forestry are the entities that provide ﬁnan-
cial services only to speciﬁc customers and very small in size, we exclude them from the
analysis in this paper.
3 Data and Methodology
Following RZ and others,4 we estimate the following model









 (Commercial bank failures)i
+ δ(Bank dependence)i;j
 (Cooperative bank failures)i
+ φ(Value added share)i;j + ϵi;j,
where the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of value added in man-
ufacturing sector j and prefecture i over the period 1992–2001, (Bank dependence)i;j is
the bank dependence index of industry j in prefecture i, (Commercial bank failures)i
is the index of the severity of the failures of regional and second-tier regional banks,
(Cooperative bank failures)i is the index of the severity of the failures of Shinkin banks
and credit cooperatives, (Value added share)i;j is the share of industry j in total value
added in manufacturing in prefecture i in 1992, and ϵi;j is the disturbance term.5
Our main interest here is the coeﬃcient of the interaction terms γ and δ. If more-
bank-dependent sectors suﬀer from a relatively lower level of growth during the banking
crises, then γ and δ would be negative. On the other hand, these coeﬃcients would be
zero, if the banking crises merely reﬂect local economic weakness.
The most disaggregated comprehensive data on value added is at the prefecture-
industry level: data at the ﬁrm level is typically limited to large listed ﬁrms, and this
limited data may not be suﬃcient because banking crises would have relatively stronger
negative eﬀects on SMEs than large listed ﬁrms.
4The RZ methodology has also been used in a variety of related problems, for instance, to examine
the role played by the concentration of the banking sector on ﬁrms with access to capital (Cetorelli
and Gambera, 2001), the linkages between ﬁnancial development and international trade pattern (Beck,
2003, 2002), bank competition and ﬁrm creation (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004), and the
real eﬀect of banking crises on short-term economic ﬂuctuations (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008).
5Japan Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (JSIC) was drastically revised in 2002. Thus, continuous
data for the following years is not available.
3Note that any price indices, as well as the local level of ﬁnancial development,6 geo-
graphical locations of prefectures, the technical features of industries, labor and capital
inputs, or a population growth, does not aﬀect the diﬀerences in the growth rate across
sectors or prefectures, which is what matters to the tests in this paper; the industry- and
the prefecture-speciﬁc eﬀects are controlled by the two sets of dummy variables.
To measure the severity of local banking crises for each prefecture, we construct a new
variable that is deﬁned as the sum of the loan amounts granted to the local customers
by the local banks that failed during the period FY 1992–FY 2001 with respect to their
ownership forms—commercial banks (regional and second-tier regional banks) and co-
operative banks (Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives)—as a share of the prefecture’s
total in 1992.7 This variable reﬂects the existence of bank failures and the relative size
of the failed banks in a local bank loan market. The number of failed local banks during
FY 1992–FY 2001 is shown in Table 1.
The corporate ﬁnance literature generally mentions that small enterprises are more
dependent on domestic bank ﬁnance than are large ﬁrms since the latter can raise capital
through domestic securities markets or international capital markets. Thus, other factors
being equal, sectors dominated by small ﬁrms should be more severely aﬀected by local
bank failures. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), we deﬁne bank dependence as the log of
the average number of employees per establishment but with the sign reversed. Since this
bank-dependence index varies with both prefectures and industries, it has an advantage
over the original RZ index, which is deﬁned as the fraction of capital expenditure not
ﬁnanced with internal funds for U.S. ﬁrms and, therefore, assumed to be stable across
space and varying only with industries.
Following RZ and others, we also include industry j’s share in prefecture i of the total
value added in manufacturing in 1992 to account for “convergence” eﬀects, that is, the
tendency of larger industries to experience slower growth. Note that the initial level of
value added, for instance, is controlled by the two sets of dummy variables. For more
details on the data, see Table 2.
4 Results
Table 3 provides the results. For the speciﬁcation (1) and (2), the point estimates of
the interaction terms predict that the failure of the cooperative bank aﬀects local growth
more severely than that of the commercial bank. These results are also true for the
speciﬁcation (3) and (4), wherein the prefecture dummy is replaced by the wide regional
dummy.8 However, none of these results are statistically signiﬁcant. The results provoke
skepticism to the comparative advantages of the cooperative ownership of banks over
their commercial ownership in promoting local economic growth.
6RZ show, by using the cross-country evidence, that ﬁnancial development disproportionately boosts
the growth of industries that are naturally heavy users of external ﬁnance.
7In the analysis, we regard Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, which was formally grouped with a city bank
but had a large market share in Hokkaido, as a regional bank in Hokkaido.
8In the speciﬁcation (3) and (4), Japan is divided into fourteen regions: Hokkaido, Kita & Minami
Tohoku, Kita & Minami Kanto, Koshinetsu, Hokuriku, Chukyo, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kita &
Minami Kyushu, and Okinawa.
45 Conclusion
This paper examines the eﬀects of the ownership forms of banks on local economic growth
using the prefecture-industry level data during Japan’s “lost decade.” If the cooperative
ownership of the bank has comparative advantages over its commercial ownership in
promoting local economic growth, the failure of a cooperative bank would be more harmful
in comparison to that of a commercial bank. The evidence in this paper, however,
provokes skepticism to this view, suggesting less eﬃcient operation of some cooperative
banks in local communities probably due to weak mechanisms for management discipline.
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index.html).
7Table 2: Data Description
Variable Description Source
Value added growth Average annual
growth rate of value
added in manufac-
turing at the 2-digit









Bank dependence Log of the average
number of employees
per establishment at
the 2-digit JSIC level
with the sign reversed
Author’s calculations
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by the failed ﬁrst-
tier and second-tier
regional banks dur-
ing FY 1992–FY 2001
to the prefecture’s to-
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years), and the ﬁnan-
cial statements of the
Shinkin banks and
credit cooperatives
Value added share Industry’s share of
value added in man-
ufacturing at the 2-
digit JSIC level (22
industries) in the pre-
fecture’s total in 1992
(in percentage terms)
Author’s calculations
based on the Cen-
sus of Manufactures,
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